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CHAPTER 9 
Return to imperial trade? John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd. as a 
contemporary free-standing company, 1945-2006 
Stephanie Decker 
 
As a trading port, Liverpool had many long-standing connections across the globe, 
especially with the colonies of the British empire. A quick browse through the Red 
Book of West Africa, a business directory of the 1920s, reveals a large number of 
Liverpool merchants who established offices in one or more of the four West African 
colonies (Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia). For Lagos, the 
number of merchants listed from Great Britain was slightly greater than that of 
indigenous enterprises (of which only the larger ones were included), and of those 
thirteen came from Liverpool, nine from Manchester and six from London.1 One of 
these companies was John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd., which was considered one of 
the three ‘giants’ of the West African trade in the interwar years.2 The company was 
founded by John Holt, who first went to Fernando Po, an island of the coast of Nigeria 
and Cameroon, in 1862, and founded the company in 1897.3 In the 1940s, Robert 
Holt, the company’s representative in Liverpool’s chamber of commerce went so far 
to claim that it was not wrong ‘to say that Liverpool was the home of the West 
African trade.’4 At the time of writing, the company, although no longer a giant, 
continues to operate in Nigeria, and has, exceptionally, kept its head office in 
Liverpool. 
John Holt highlights this connection in its corporate communications through 
its logo: the round shape is a manilla, ‘previously used in some parts of Nigeria as 
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currency’ and the five-point star ‘signifies the Group’s enduring connection with 
Liverpool, UK.’5 The five-pointed star is related to Liverpool’s maritime past.6 The 
famous White Star Line, the company which owned the Titanic, also used a five-
pointed white star, on a red flag.7 In choosing a corporate logo from two historical 
symbols, one specific to Nigerian economic and cultural history, the other 
representative of Liverpool Atlantic history, the company continues to place itself as 
the agent linking those two places, which in turn defines its identity as an 
organisation.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13  John Holt company logo 
 
This chapter seeks to bring together Holt’s corporate history after 1945, and 
analyse it in the light of trends and theories in international business.8 In the early-
2000s, John Holt is probably one of the few remaining corporate links between 
Nigeria and Liverpool, and its survival, in the face of Liverpool’s decline and 
Nigeria’s reputation as one of the most difficult places in the world to do business, 
seems extraordinary. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, these two factors are 
integral to understanding Holt’s survival and the cause of its organisational form that 
connects the head office in Liverpool with the Nigerian subsidiary. This type of 
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company is known as free-standing, which means that its head office is located in a 
different country from its operations. It has generally been considered a historical 
phenomenon.9 By uncovering the rationale for Holt’s adoption of this form, this case 
study adds to the existing debate by analysing the competitive advantage of a Free-
Standing Company (FSC) and by showing how it diverges from the explanations put 
forward in the literature.  
John Holt & Co is an interesting case study because it followed the major 
trends in international business. Holt’s corporate development fell into three distinct 
phases (see Table 1), of which the first two were common for British business in these 
years. From its inception until its merger with Lonrho, Holt was a family-run 
business. This has been described as ‘personal capitalism’ by Alfred Chandler, who 
argued that this was typical of British business.10 From the 1950s onwards, Holt 
experimented with new enterprises, and introduced new divisions to its core business. 
Eventually it merged with the large conglomerate Lonrho. This trend to diversify and 
spread risk geographically and through more varied activities has been described by 
Geoffrey Jones for this period.11 Hence much of Holt’s organisational changes reflect 
wider trends in international business.  
In contrast to this, recent developments appear more surprising, as Holt has 
returned to an organisational form that many business historians consider obsolete in 
today’s world economy. Important changes began in the mid-1980s, eventually 
leading to Holt becoming free-standing. Like personal capitalism and the 
diversification strategy of the 1950s and 1960s, FSCs epitomised imperial business 
and were commonly registered in London, but also in Glasgow, Edinburgh, 
Manchester and Liverpool. However, Holt is not the representative of a wider trend in 
this respect, at least not according to scholarly opinion. FSCs were considered an 
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important form of international investment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, but were thought to have declined after 1950. Although some are still in 
existence, most scholars, including Mira Wilkins, who first coined the term, consider 
it a rare and unimportant form of foreign direct investment for the late-twentieth 
century or the early-2000s.12  
The main focus of the following section is to explain the most recent corporate 
history and the logic behind adopting this organisational form. However, the question 
arises whether Holt’s recent history is really an exception, or rather indicative of a 
trend that can be discerned in Britain’s commercial links with the developing parts of 
the world, and of trends in international business more generally. 
 
Table 1 Phases of corporate development 
1897 Incorporated as a private limited liability company in the UK 
1940s-1966 Personal capitalism: management by family members and close 
associates 
1950 Change to a public limited liability company 
1957 Holt bought Bartholomew (London) Ltd. and entered motor 
distribution and related engineering 
1960 Holt bought West African Drugs Co., a pharmacy chain 
1962 Holt sold its southern African subsidiary 
1964 Holt sold Guinea Gulf Line to United Africa  
Company’s Palm Line 
1966 Change in top management, family members no longer in executive 
positions 
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1969-1997 Managerial capitalism: part of Lonrho 
1969 Bought by Lonrho 
1984 Wine and Spirits business sold 
1996/1997 Lonrho split up into Lonrho Africa (includes Holt) and Lonmin (all 
core mining activities) 
1997-2006 Holt as a contemporary free-standing company 
1997-2001 Lonrho Africa 
2001 Management Buy Out by three associates (Nigerian, English and 
Scottish) 
2001–2006 Free-standing company, based in Liverpool 
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From colonial merchant to multinational 
 
From its inception until 1966, the founding families controlled John Holt, making it a 
typical case of British personal capitalism: medium-sized, family-owned and 
controlled by some loyal key employees. Chandler explained this British ‘peculiarity’ 
as a feature of Britain’s earlier industrialisation, when the lack of transport and 
modern communications, as well as the smaller size of the British domestic market 
meant that companies had less reason to exploit economies of scale than their 
American counterparts. Most other British trading companies, with the exception of 
the United African Company (UAC), were of a similar size and family controlled.13 
Originally, Holt traded in general produce and merchandise. Liverpool’s 
connections to West Africa were based on the import of tropical agricultural products, 
like groundnuts, cocoa, palm oil and kernels. In addition to this, the Gold Coast 
exported gold and Nigeria tin, as well as some rubber. Merchant companies shipped 
these commodities out and brought simple consumer goods like cloth, gin and lamps 
to West Africa. They rarely traded with the final consumer, but rather passed on 
goods to African traders and market women locally. This distribution structure was 
the result of the ongoing expansion of companies like John Holt that began in the late 
nineteenth century. When Holt’s founder, Robert Holt, first went to the coast in the 
1860s and 1870s, many traders were based on the island of Fernando Po in the Bight 
of Biafra, of the coast of present day Nigeria.14 Goods were bought and sold off ships 
that were permanently moored off the West African coast, and Europeans rarely 
ventured on the land as they fell prey to tropical diseases. This changed with medical 
advances in malaria treatment and prophylaxis, and this would have a strong impact 
on the exchange between Europeans and Africans. Hand in hand with the colonial 
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expansion, merchants, mainly from Liverpool, Manchester and London, expanded 
their networks along the rivers and, later in the twentieth century, the railway lines, 
displacing and undermining indigenous commercial elites in the process.15 However, 
this was not always the case, as the merchant expansion was in some cases the making 
of some prominent African trading families. The overall impact was, however, that by 
the middle of the twentieth century, trade in goods for import or export was firmly in 
European hands.  
After World War Two, Britain’s importance in the global economy diminished 
rapidly, with its share in world exports dropping from 25 to 8 per cent between 1950 
and 1970. At the same time, Sterling lost its role as second reserve currency. During 
the 1950s about one-half of world trade was denominated in Sterling, which declined 
to 20 per cent in 1970.16 This reflected a change in global trade flows. Hence 
Liverpool’s role as a gateway to West Africa became less important. Companies in 
West Africa increasingly abandoned their old commodity trade to focus on more 
specialised lines, and shifted from retail to wholesale distribution. This was known as 
redeployment.17  
Redeployment was not a purely commercial decision. It was strongly 
influenced by Colonial Office decisions, which helped to determine the political 
economy of West Africa beyond independence.18 Previously, the merchants had 
bought produce from farmers and middlemen up-country for export, in return 
importing general goods that they traded via their large distribution networks, which 
were also the produce-buying stations in the harvest season.19 After World War Two, 
the colonial administration decided to continue the war-time arrangement of 
marketing boards, which effectively bought and traded agricultural produce 
centrally.20 While British firms were appointed as buying agents for the marketing 
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boards, their profit margins declined and African politicians increasingly demanded 
that local traders should get preference.21  
After many mergers and acquisitions in the West African trade in the 1920s 
and 1930s, only the largest merchant houses survived. The UAC, together with its two 
French counterparts Compagnie Française d’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) and Société 
Commerciale de l’Ouest d’Afrique (SCOA), controlled two-thirds to three-fourths of 
all import and export trade in West Africa. After World War II this trade was valued 
at £300 to £400 million annually, of which the UAC had captured the largest share 
with a turnover between £200 and £300 million.22 Holt was the second largest British 
trader, though much smaller than UAC, it was still considered one of the ‘giants’ of 
West African trade in the late 1930s.23 Although the UAC was London-based, one of 
its largest trading subsidiaries, the almost independently operated GB Ollivants, had 
its headquarters in Manchester, which underlines the importance of the Northwest of 
England vis-à-vis London in the West African trade. 
To nationalist politicians and their electorate, this situation was anathema, and 
foreign companies were pressurized to hand over the traditional import and export 
business to their African agents and new competitors. Merchant houses invested in 
wholesale distribution operations, more technically sophisticated goods and 
department stores. Cities like Liverpool increasingly became simply the corporate 
headquarters, and the links, which had been created through the exchange of goods 
and people, began to deteriorate. Holt eventually withdrew from its original business, 
the export of tropical produce, in the mid-1960s, although the firm had experienced 
declining profitability throughout the 1950s.24 It eventually sold its shipping line in 
the mid-1960s, when concentration, containerisation and national shipping lines in 
West African states made the operations to complex and expensive. 
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By 1962, the traditional West African trades performed badly. Although Holt’s 
newer investments in West Africa, mainly industrial ventures, also experienced some 
problems in that particular year, they were nevertheless on the whole uniformly 
profitable, offsetting some of the decline in the traditional divisions.25 The shipping 
line, another long-established branch of the business, was also affected by import 
substitution and sourcing of imports from new trading partners other than the UK: 
 
[…] the outward tonnage from both the United Kingdom and the Continent 
fell drastically during the year, due to local production in Nigeria and 
imports from other countries at cut prices. Furthermore the effect of the 
Ghana budget in 1961 and the new trading agreements entered into by the 
emergent African states with non-traditional sources, dislocated the 
traditional sources from which cargoes come.26 
 
West African trade was influenced by a number of factors, as the quotation above 
highlights. Some were European in nature: Britain’s relative decline as a trading and 
manufacturing country, Liverpool’s decline as a port, the slow reorientation of British 
trade towards Europe, away from the United States and the empire (which affected 
Liverpool due to its geographic position).27 Others reflected changes in the 
international economy: newly industrialising countries like Japan began to catch up 
with Europe and competed successfully in African markets, where their lower priced 
goods replaced European products. Holt actually switched its source of textiles from 
Lancashire to Japan in the 1950s.28 The political decisions taken by countries such as 
Ghana, which under Nkrumah began to turn towards Communist countries in the 
early-1960s, meant that more goods were imported from there. Ghana’s balance of 
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payments deteriorated when the price for its main export, cocoa, began to decline in 
1959. Hence the country struggled to earn sufficient foreign currency for imports. 
Ghana’s budget of 1961 introduced compulsory savings of 5 per cent on incomes over 
an annual threshold of £120, which reduced consumer spending even further.29 But 
even Nigeria, whose government did not show any interest in socialist measures, no 
longer sourced the majority of its imports from the UK. 
Holt’s attempts to reposition its operations in West Africa in response to the 
economic and political changes during decolonisation were overseen by members of 
the founding families, although the company went public as early as 1950. However, 
the majority of its shares were still held by family members. The company introduced 
a divisional structure in 1958, in order to gain Overseas Trade Corporation status.30 
Holt entered motor distribution and engineering in 1957 when the company bought 
Bartholomew (London) Ltd. The company also expanded into manufacturing, 
investing in a stationer, a canning factory, the production of metal windows, 
enamelware, perfumes and agricultural equipment. In 1960 Holt also bought the West 
African Drug Co., a pharmaceutical concern.31 
Although still family-owned and controlled, Holt introduced a 
multidivisional structure. This organisational form was considered by Chandler as one 
of the key elements in the development of managerial capitalism, particularly in 
industry.32 Both management decisions – adopting a divisional structure and 
eventually accepting an offer by Lonrho – were part of a diversification strategy that 
was typical of international trading companies in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.33 
Holt not only diversified into new enterprises in West Africa, but 
also expanded geographically, and had at one time subsidiaries in French West Africa, 
southern Africa, France, the UK and the US.34  It was the expropriation of Holt’s 
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property in Gabon that led the company to venture into metropolitan France, as the 
compensation was paid in Francs and could not be taken outside the currency zone. 
Members of the Holt family were great wine lovers and this led to the acquisition of a 
vineyard and a shipper, Louis Eschenauer S.A., and eventually a chain of 80 off-
licenses in the UK.35  
In 1962 the wine and spirits trade had a larger turnover than the West African 
trade (31 and 25 per cent respectively). However, Holt’s was shifting its focus to 
industrial ventures in West and southern Africa, which already comprised 25 per cent 
of turnover (labelled Investments in Figure 2). Shipping was conducted by the Guinea 
Gulf Line, created late in the 1940s (although the company owned ships long before 
that) which Holt sold in 1964 to the UAC’s Palm Line.36  
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Figure 9.1 Proportion of turnover by business division, year ending 1962 
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Source: 66th Annual Report & Statement of Accounts, 31 August 1962, Chairman's Statement, p. 5. 
 
The late-1960s posed new challenges. In 1966, both Nigeria and Ghana 
suffered military coups. While Ghana returned to a short-lived democracy between 
1969 and 1972, Nigeria experienced intense ethnic rivalries over the oil resources in 
the east and descended into civil war in 1968, when the Eastern region seceded under 
the name of Biafra.37  Political instability threatened the company’s position, 
particularly in Nigeria. In 1969, the Inchcape group attempted to take over the 
company, but failed. A hostile take-over attempt was made by Oliver Jessel, who was 
described by Holt’s chairman, Paul Newns, as an asset-stripper. At the invitation of a 
member of the Holt family, Tiny Rowland rode in ‘like the knight in shining armour’, 
according to Paul Newns, chairman of John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, and bought 
the company in agreement with its management.38 (Rowland was famously branded 
the ‘unacceptable face of capitalism’ in 1973 by Edward Heath, then Britain’s prime 
minister.) This was a great opportunity for Lonrho, as Holt’s share price was at its 
lowest in the middle of the civil war. The purchase was made by issuing a package of 
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Lonrho shares, traded on a two-to-one basis with Holt shares, which were valued at £8 
million. At this time the company had a turnover of more than £30 million annually, 
and provided a ready source of cash for Lonrho.39 In subsequent years, Holt, operating 
in the booming Nigerian oil economy of the 1970s, contributed up to 40 per cent of 
Lonrho’s overall profits, similar to the relationship between the UAC and its parent 
Unilever.40 Evidence for the time when Holt was part of Lonrho is scarce, but oral 
evidence indicates that the company continued to develop its operations on similar 
lines.  
The 1960s, when Holt was eventually absorbed by Lonrho, was a decade 
dominated by mergers, which transformed British business from small atomistic firms 
to a highly concentrated ‘big business’. Hence Holt’s development was part of a wider 
change in the corporate environment, as companies went public (Holt in 1950), 
founding families relinquished control (Holt in 1966) and thus became more 
vulnerable to hostile takeovers. Takeovers, which previously had been virtually 
unknown, now encouraged some companies to follow a strategy of defensive or pre-
emptive mergers with a party of their choice, in order to avoid to be swallowed by a 
more aggressive competitor.41 
 
A free-standing company in Liverpool 
 
Holt continued to operate almost autonomously within Lonrho, which was similar to 
many other acquisitions by Tiny Rowland, for example the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation in Ghana, which ran a mine in Obuasi.42 Interestingly, it was when Holt 
was still part of Lonrho that the first steps towards becoming free-standing were 
taken. In the 1980s, on the suggestion of Rowland, Holt divested most of its non-
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African ventures, selling its wine and spirits division, John Holt Vintners Ltd. in 
1982.43 Eventually the company focused exclusively on Nigeria, after disposing of its 
subsidiaries in Ghana in the early-1990s (where Holt was never as strongly 
represented as in Nigeria, ever since the company first entered the Gold Coast in 
1930).44 Hence Holt was already effectively free-standing, although within the larger 
group of Lonrho and later Lonrho Africa. In some ways this relationship is 
reminiscent of the business groups or networks that were commonly found in clusters 
of FSCs in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. 
This policy of ‘down scoping’, of divesting non-core enterprises, would 
eventually reach the parent company, Lonrho, after Rowland was ousted from 
management by Dieter Bock. The pressures of the British capital market, where large 
institutional shareholders pushed for high returns and preferred individual firms that 
focused on their core activities, explains why the trend to de-merge and down scope 
was more prevalent in the UK than in continental Europe.45 Bock de-merged the 
multinational into Lonmin (Lonrho’s mining activities) and Lonrho Africa 
(agriculture, trading companies, and hotels). Lonrho’s progeny continued to spin apart 
after its founding father had gone, with Ashanti Goldfields in Ghana merging with 
AngloGold from South Africa in 2004.46  
The interests of Holt’s management and Lonrho Africa diverged, and when the 
company went through a time of poor commercial performance, three executives – 
Paul Newns (from England), now Chairman of John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd., 
James McLardy (from Scotland), formerly the Managing Director of the Nigerian 
subsidiary, and Chief Christopher Ikechi Ezeh (from Nigeria), McLardy’s successor 
in the 1990s, and, at the time of writing Chairman of John Holt PLC – undertook a 
management buy-out (MBO) in 2001. The company continues with a small head 
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office in Pall Mall, Liverpool, which sources the imports for Nigeria globally. In 
Nigeria, John Holt PLC is registered on the stock exchange and 47 per cent of shares 
are in the hands of a little less than 53,000 small local investors. The majority of these 
Nigerian shareholders hold less than 0.1 per cent of the equity.47 The rest (53 per cent) 
is owned by the British company. 
Current business can be roughly placed into two categories: motors and sales. 
The company imports, assembles or manufactures generators, power units, 
motorcycles, boats and outboard engines. Of these, generators and outboard engines 
from Yamaha are the main imported lines. Holt holds a franchise for FG Wilson 
(Engineering) Ltd. and Yamaha, amongst others. They are sold or leased out to other 
companies, especially in the oil industry, either directly or through their distribution 
network. Holt entered motor distribution and technical engineering in the 1950s. At 
the time, the most profitable activity is the sale, leasing and servicing of generators, 
which, in a country like Nigeria that suffers several power cuts daily even its largest 
city, Lagos, has a huge dependent market.48  
The other branch of their business is based on cash-and-carry outlets and their 
nationwide distribution network in Nigeria. Most of the consumer goods are locally 
produced (about 90 per cent according to Paul Newns), mainly by multinationals in 
Nigeria such as Nestlé and Unilever, but also by some local firms, particularly in the 
beverage and food industry, as well as roofing supplies.49 This side of Holt’s activities 
in Nigeria shows surprising continuities with the company’s original colonial retail 
trade. 
The management buy-out from Lonrho Africa, after the de-merger from 
Lonrho, was part of a wider trend in the 1990s that witnessed large, conglomerate 
companies down scope. However, this trend also affected smaller firms like Holt, 
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which had been narrowing down its operations since the 1980s. Lonrho was always 
particularly strong in east and southern Africa, and Lonrho Africa operated with 
headquarters in Nairobi and Harare until 2001, when they were closed down in favour 
of a smaller Liverpool office. A subsidiary like Holt, which operated exclusively in 
Nigeria, was probably marginal to Lonrho Africa. Moreover, the company did not 
perform well after the spin-off, and in early 2001 it sold off many enterprises in order 
to reduce bank borrowings, which amounted to £26 million net. Under these 
circumstances, Holt’s management chose to leave the group.50 
While these factors explain Holt’s decision to leave Lonrho Africa and focus 
on its Nigerian business, it does not provide a sufficient explanation why the company 
continued to conduct its business via a UK-based head office. In a corporate profile 
from 2005, the PLC highlighted that the relationship with its Liverpool-based parent 
company has been beneficial in attracting ‘strong franchises and international 
brands’.51 According to its Managing Director, Bill Laurie, retaining a UK-based head 
office while conducting business with only one country is commercially necessary. 
Nigeria has been recognised as a difficult place to do business and suffers from 
information asymmetries, poor infrastructures and the absence of institutions that 
promote trust and transparency.52 In the most recent ‘ease of doing business’ survey 
by the World Bank, Nigeria came 108th out of 175 countries in 2006.53 Much 
managerial time is necessary for negotiations and maintaining commercial 
relationships, and administrative procedures are often irregular and unreliable. These 
problems are common in less developed countries, especially in Africa, and the 
amount of time spent on negotiation as well as the local knowledge necessary make 
more focused operations preferable. 
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It is especially corruption, measured by so-called corruption perception 
indices, that has earned Nigeria a poor reputation, although there has been a slight 
improvement in recent years, according to Transparency International (see Table 2). 
However, the only countries that had a lower score than Nigeria in 2005 in the 
corruption index were those which had not been assessed in previous years.  (The 
ratings in the index range from zero for the most corrupt to ten for the least venal). 
Corruption indices have their problems especially the tendency to mask the source of 
illicit money, which mainly comes from Europe and North America.54 
 
Table 2 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International 
Country 2005 2000 1999 1996 1988-1992 1980-1985 
Bangladesh 1.7 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Cameroon 2.2 2 1.5 2.46 3.43 4.59 
Chad 1.7 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Haiti 1.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Myanmar 1.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Nigeria 1.9 1.2 1.6 0.69 0.63 0.99 
Turkmenistan 1.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Source: Transparency International, Internet Centre for Corruption Research, see 
www.icgg.org/corruptioin.cpi_olderindices_overview.html [accessed 8 September 2006]. 
 
The function of the Liverpool company follows logically from the business 
conditions in Nigeria, which require close personal contact and tight controls, since 
financial fraud (via credit cards and e-mail scams) are prevalent.55 The current set-up 
of nested companies, like the structure of John Holt, where the Liverpool company 
(owned by the three non-executive Directors) owns 53 per cent of the Nigerian 
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company, is relatively more expensive to maintain but ‘there are very sound 
commercial reasons for it’, according to Bill Laurie.56 Nigeria’s reputation is 
relatively poor internationally, and many of the companies that John Holt trades with, 
or holds franchises and trademarks from, are generally not prepared to negotiate with 
Nigerian firms. Hence the UK-based company functions as an intermediary, holding 
the Yamaha franchise, which it leases to its subsidiary, John Holt PLC. The Liverpool 
office functions as a buffer that absorbs the country-specific risk that many 
international companies are unwilling to take.57 The risks for John Holt & Co 
(Liverpool) Ltd. are of course minimal, as the company deals with its own subsidiary, 
where they have close personal contact with the staff handling the business.  
What remains an intriguing question is why did Holt decide to keep its head 
office in Liverpool? Most of the firm’s competitors moved their headquarters to 
London. While Liverpool’s decline as a port and commercial centre was apparent 
from the 1960s, Holt kept its head office in the city and even invested in a chain of 
off-licenses in the North West. The chairman commented on the situation, in 1962: 
 
Finally I should mention that in the last few months there has been a 
considerable mis-informed conjecture about the future prosperity of 
Merseyside, with which we are, of course, deeply concerned. Denigration 
of a city is, of course, cumulative and in the end leads to a lack of business 
confidence. I should therefore reveal that our own experience in Liverpool 
and the surrounding areas over the last four months shows that sales have 
in fact been in excess of those for the same period in the previous year, and 
indications are that in a full year they will no be less than those achieved in 
the previous year. Our confidence in the North West is such that active 
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steps are being taken to increase our expansion in this area and very 
recently five new retail outlets have been opened.58 
 
It is interesting that the 1960s have been described by Jon Murden as the height 
of Liverpool’s post-war golden age, with unemployment at an all time low around the 
middle of the decade and the port enjoying record figures for cargo throughput in 
1965.59 While business in Liverpool continued to perform well, it was clear that its 
economic prospects were poor – a skills shortage coupled with long-term 
unemployment added to the structural problems of a port which contended with 
containerisation, air freight and the shift of trade to Europe. 
While Holt’s wine business did not show any adverse trends in the early-1960s, 
the sale of its shipping line minimised the impact of the decline of the port. 
Increasingly, goods were sourced from different international locations, and the wine 
and spirits venture was sold off. Liverpool became the organisational base for the 
head office. As such, the decline of prices (in properties, wages, services etc.) was 
actually advantageous conditions for Holt. While the draw of the City was highly 
influential in the decision of companies to relocate from Liverpool to London (see 
Rory Miller and Robert Greenhill’s contribution on South America in this volume), 
Holt appeared to stay immune. Although the company went public in 1950, family 
members held the majority of the equity, reducing the need for outside finance. Hence 
Holt expanded through re-investment, as solid family holdings meant that the 
company could afford to pay low dividends for several years.60  In the late-1960s, the 
company became vulnerable to external financial pressure, especially during the 
Nigerian civil war, when its share price fell and business was severely limited. After 
the takeover by Lonrho, any pressure on Holt to relocate subsided, as access to the 
 319
City was assured through the holding company. Even more importantly, the trade with 
Nigeria proved to be hugely profitable in the 1970s, but effectively hidden from 
public scrutiny within Lonrho. 
Another factor, according to Paul Newns, was the availability of people with the 
right skills, which stems from Liverpool’s historical role in the trade with Africa.61 
This does not just refer to the company itself, but also to the service industry, 
especially finance and export agencies. Due to Liverpool’s long-standing involvement 
in international trade, financial institutions in the city offer important services such as 
confirmed letters of credit  that are essential for dealing with less developed and 
inherently financially more risky countries.62 Because of the absence of competing 
economic demands, the city remained as a hub for trade with the countries that 
emerged from the British empire. Holt’s logo also points towards the importance of 
tradition, even though it is no longer family owned. Liverpool’s advantage appears to 
be rooted in its long-term historical legacy of trading with the west coast of Africa 
and its relatively cheap labour and property costs, which make it a competitive 
location for a smaller firm.  
 
Nationality, reputation, and the contemporary free-standing company 
 
As a result of the management buy-out (MBO), Holt has become a FSC. Holt retained 
its Liverpool head office, with about a dozen staff, and the UK company owns more 
than half the equity of the Nigerian subsidiary, which effectively conducts all 
operations. This is considered an unusual organisational form for multinational 
business in the early-twenty first century, but was indeed quite common in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  
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There has been an ongoing debate about the factors that favoured the 
emergence of large numbers of this type of company in the high imperial age. There is 
a wide agreement among scholars that this form was not viable long-term, and that the 
conditions which favoured FSCs changed in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Wilkins, for example, admits that a few random survivors exist nowadays, but 
considers them insignificant on a global scale.63 Nevertheless, Geoffrey Jones has 
pointed to the recent recovery of Standard Chartered Bank, which failed to enter its 
‘home’ UK market and eventually returned successfully to its old form of operation as 
an essentially overseas bank.64 The Standard group is one of the largest companies in 
Africa, especially as its subsidiaries were ranked separately in a recent publication.65 
However, its head office in London fulfils a wide range of central and financial 
functions, which are integral to its operations. Hence it is questionable whether it 
should really be counted as an FSC.  
Holt is an even more interesting case than Standard Chartered, because trading 
companies are not always classified as FSCs, although they might be organised along 
FSC lines. Wilkins excluded firms that trade with the home economy, because their 
logic of operation remains bound to the home economy.66 However, this depends on 
whether one considers the development of a FSC as the key feature of the definition, 
or its organisational structure. Is it more important that this type of company did not 
export its competitive advantage, or that it is a firm that conducts business exclusively 
abroad with a small head office? Even though a trading company is logically a firm 
that developed out of the needs of its home economy, it remains a fairly uneasy case. 
Whether Holt was freestanding at the beginning of its corporate history or not is, 
however, not the key concern here. More importantly, Holt is currently freestanding, 
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because all its trade is in Nigeria, and the goods traded are sourced locally or 
internationally, but not specifically from the UK. 
From 2001 John Holt was clearly free-standing: all its business operations 
were in one country, Nigeria, whereas its overall head office and parent company was 
located in another. The Liverpool headquarters employed only a dozen people, 
whereas the PLC in Nigeria employed about 900. As a case study of a contemporary 
FSC, John Holt does not easily fit the features identified as typical for these 
companies in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Old-style FSCs would 
have been incorporated only in the UK, but under current legislation this would no 
longer be possible. Nevertheless, the Liverpool company is more than just a holding 
company, though it no longer coordinates any business in Britain. As Holt faced new 
conditions in the early twenty-first century, it is not surprising that the logic behind its 
move to assume the form of a FSC was also different from that of nineteenth-century 
or early-twentieth-century companies. 
However, John Holt PLC is not wholly owned by the UK company, which sets 
the firm apart from old-style FSCs. This is a response to economic nationalism in 
Nigeria. Far from being instrumental in the demise of the FSC, as Wilkins suggested, 
certain forms of economic nationalism, such as the less radical local content 
requirements, can co-exist with FSCs.67 Nationalist legislation can vary in its 
intensity, and does not necessarily end in full expropriation of foreign owners. In the 
1970s, Nigeria decreed local participation ratios, which required Holt to reorganise its 
business, incorporate locally (in 1969) and sell at first 40 per cent of its equity in 
1974, and then 60 per cent three years later. The company was free to sell in any form 
and to any buyer without government interference (although in 1977 individuals were 
not permitted to purchase more than 5 per cent of the equity of any one company).68 
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In 1974, Holt had two options: either ‘go friendly’, or go public.  Its executive, Tom 
Prentice, opted to go public and to spread its shareholding widely, which ensured 
continuity and control by Lonrho. Other companies went ‘friendly’ (also denounced 
locally as ‘fronting’), a decision which many regretted if relations soured with their 
indigenous partners and lost control over their investment.69  
Holt’s customers in Nigeria, for example Shell and other petroleum companies 
leasing boats or buying electricity generators, have to fulfil local content 
requirements. They can point to John Holt PLC’s 53,000 Nigerian shareholders, 
which represent almost half the equity of the firm.70 At the same time, international 
trading partners and licensees like Yamaha deal with the UK company, eliminating 
the Nigerian country risk (see above).  
Whether it is Holt’s association with Britain, which in the twenty-first century 
has recovered its commercial reputation after the long era of post-war ‘decline’, or 
Nigeria, which has become a byword internationally for irregular trading practices 
and corruption, that is the key factor determining this corporate set-up is unclear. 
What this case study shows, nevertheless, is that corporate nationality has been used 
by John Holt as an asset to create economies of reputation. The corporate structure 
internalises the advantages of national reputation: English internationally, Nigerian in 
the country of operation; hence, the firm’s logo identifying itself strongly with 
historical symbols from both Liverpool’s maritime past and Nigerian monetary 
history (cf. Figure 9.1).  
For Holt, the advantages of becoming free- standing differ from claims made 
in the literature on earlier examples. Instead of showing weaker control structures 
than classical multinational companies, the set-up allows for closer personal control 
in a highly insecure environment. This has similarly been argued by Rory Miller for 
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British business in Latin America in the nineteenth century.71 Typical multinational 
advantages like knowledge transfer are less relevant for business in Nigeria, as a 
highly specific local knowledge and personal networks are more important to business 
success. Thus the Liverpool head office ensures close personal control over the 
Nigerian subsidiary, while also serving as an intermediary that minimises risk to 
suppliers. Equally importantly, it permits ambiguity surrounding the nationality 
question. 
Holt’s corporate history also confounds another expectation of scholars of the 
free-standing company. Wilkins assumed that firms will be free-standing in the first 
stages of their corporate life, and subsequent development would follow any of these 
routes: some survived as free-standing, many went out of business, and others became 
fully-fledged multinationals.72 Holt actually went from colonial merchant to 
multinational and then became a FSC, quite in contrast to the development suggested 
by Wilkins.  
While Holt is only one case, and has yet to prove great longevity in its current 
free-standing form, it is important to note that the conditions that gave rise to its 
corporate organisation still exist all over Africa, and in many parts of the developing 
world. The trend to down scope also leads to more specialised companies, which 
could mean a new rise in the number of FSCs. Apart from Standard Chartered, which 
is free standing, with subsidiaries in Africa (and thus regionally diversified to some 
extent), there is also Lonrho Africa PLC, which now operates hotels and agribusiness, 
and was headquartered for a short period of time in Liverpool before moving back to 
London. Most of the old trading companies of West Africa still exist: PZCussons 
(formerly Paterson Zochonis, headquartered in Manchester), Leventis, Chellarams, 
SCOA (Société Générale de l’Ouest d’Afrique) and CFAO (Compagnie Française 
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d’Afrique Occidentale), and it is hence not inconceivable that at least some of them 
operate as FSCs. Unfortunately information is scarce on these survivors of the 
imperial trade with West Africa. 
Some scholars, especially Marc Casson but also Ben Gales and Keetie 
Sluyterman, have pointed out that FSCs were typical of imperialism and relied on the 
political structure of this particular international system.73 Others, like Harm 
Schroeter and Wilkins, consider them not necessarily an imperial feature, but as 
particularly well adapted to the less developed countries, where they survived for 
longer.74 This suggests that further research into how business deals with the specific 
problems of emerging markets and developing economies is necessary, and that the 
free-standing form might have more timeless advantages than has been realised. 
Although these companies have been associated with the imperial system, this might 
just have been a reflection of the political status quo. Their re-emergence at the end of 
the twentieth century, provided Holt is not an exception, means that a global economy 
that allows finance, trade and other services to move relatively freely between 
countries, coupled with vast disparities between the wealth of trading partners and 
their relative administrative sophistication, are essential features that give rise to free-
standing companies. Wilkins suggested that the ‘free-standing-company form of 
business was used when it supplied a need.’75 Clearly, FSCs like Holt now serve 
different needs than its forbearers, and thus follow a different logic. Some parameters, 
however, should be reasonably similar. 
Is Jones correct in suggesting that some features of the international 
environment have returned to the conditions of 1914, thus making the FSC a viable 
organisational form again?76 However, Jones has also highlighted some of the key 
differences between 1914 and 2000, for example the dominance of large institutional 
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shareholders like pension funds, which often press companies to decide in favour of 
short-term profitability. As a matter of fact, neither Holt nor Lonrho Africa have 
proved very profitable in recent years. Nevertheless, down scoping is one outcome of 
this financial environment, as investors prefer focused operations with high returns.  
In 1914 the stock exchange mainly served the interests of private, individual 
investors. What is similar, though, is that the City of London has recovered its 
position as one of the most important financial centres in the world. It could be argued 
that it again provides the finance for emerging markets. However, whether this is 
relevant to the case of Holt is doubtful, because if this was one of the key reasons for 
the company to become free-standing, it would be more likely that it was 
headquartered in London. 
While it is tempting to argue that the existence of FSCs can be explained by a 
neo-imperial, globalised world economy, it is more likely that the huge disparities in 
wealth and economic development are in themselves the cause. Regional specialist 
firms act as go-betweens for international investors, as they understand the countries 
and have the all-important local contacts. For most major multinationals, the African 
markets are simply too small to make the forward investment in marketing and 
distribution, let alone production. This means that specialist companies with a long 
tradition of conducting business in Africa, together with the increasingly important 
South African companies, dominate the business environment in Africa.77  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sketched the corporate history of the Liverpool-based West Africa 
merchant John Holt & Co from the 1940s onwards. In the second half of the twentieth 
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century, the company underwent a number of organisational changes, which 
transformed the nature of its business. Surprisingly, however, the firm returned to its 
original focus on operations in Nigeria after having expanded within and outside 
Africa from the 1930s onwards. While its main British competitor, the much larger 
UAC, was absorbed by its parent Unilever in the 1980s, Holt stayed independent 
within the conglomerate of Lonrho, but was encouraged to shed all other investments 
outside Nigeria. Eventually, Holt left its parent in 2001 in a MBO.  
This chapter has brought together for the first time the existing information on 
Holt’s history after 1945, but also questions the prevailing wisdom that FSCs are an 
obsolete organisational form. Holt’s case shows that its Liverpool head office fulfilled 
a number of highly important functions such as mediating between the international 
economy, for example by holding franchises, and insuring against country-specific 
risk, by allowing close control of the link between its Nigerian subsidiary and 
international partners. There is also a possibility that more FSCs have emerged as a 
result of a wave of de-mergers and corporate down scoping in the 1990s. Many firms 
now dealing with less-developed countries are smaller and more specific than the 
large conglomerate trading companies of the preceding decades. The advantage of 
local knowledge, contacts, a good distribution network, and, especially, the ability to 
be ambiguous about corporate nationality still enable Holt to be competitive in the 
modern economy in a way that the authors of the FSC concept did not envisage. In a 
global economy that has increasingly sidelined the African continent where business 
practices are divergent from international norms, Holt’s case indicates how a 
Liverpool-headquartered business continues to bridge the gap between international 
and local business cultures. 
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